


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Intelligence Memorandum

Soviet Leaders and Succession

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Soviet Leaders and Succession

Summary

This memorandum contains articles on the Soviet leadership that were originally prepared to run serially in a daily publication. It begins with a discussion of the generational problem in the Politburo and ends with a look at the environment in which the Soviet leaders operate, with special attention to the bureaucratic and institutional pressures on them. The memorandum examines those leaders who seem to have a chance of succeeding to one of the top jobs, both in the near and longer terms.

At present, men in their late 60s and early 70s occupy the key positions of power. Held together by a balance of power and self-interest, they have been a force for stabilization in leadership politics. They have restrained Brezhnev in his attempts at self-aggrandizement, but they have also inhibited challenges to him that might have threatened them all.

Kirilenko

No one among the younger leaders has a strong claim to Brezhnev's job. Of the senior leaders, Kirilenko, who is the same age as Brezhnev, probably has the best chance of becoming General Secretary if Brezhnev were to leave the scene. At 67, however, he could be no more than an interim choice for General Secretary, and his prospects for moving up to the top party post will diminish with each additional year that Brezhnev holds this position. As a successor to Brezhnev, Kirilenko would stand as a fairly orthodox Marxist-Leninist. At least initially, he would be more cautious about dealing with the West, but his approach probably would not deviate sharply from the course that has been followed under Brezhnev. Whatever his personal views on policy, as a compromise candidate he could not move any further than his Politburo colleagues would allow. Any gradual shift in foreign policy would probably be to de-emphasize detente rather than to expand it.

Mazurov

Among the "younger" Soviet leaders, First Deputy Premier Mazurov at 60 has the clearest chance of one day assuming a top leadership post. Since 1965 he has served as Premier Kosygin's top government assistant on industrial matters. His claim to the premiership, whenever Kosygin relinquishes it, was considerably enhanced a

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year ago by the demotion of the other first deputy premier, Polyansky, to minister of agriculture. Mazurov has gained the reputation of being one of the more modern-minded members of the regime, while still hewing to traditional ideas on some aspects of domestic and foreign policy.

His avoidance of clear cut and controversial positions makes it difficult to give him a political label, even in his principal area of responsibility as chief government overseer of industry. On some issues, his approach to economic questions appears designed to play both sides of the street. On the whole, however, he seems to have a good grasp of the complexity and interdependence of most economic matters, and he is receptive to innovative ideas. He has been ahead of other leaders in advocating a systems approach to various economic problems.

Grishin - The Cautious Bureaucrat

As party boss of the important Moscow city apparatus, Politburo member Viktor Grishin is in a good position to succeed ultimately to a top leadership post in the CPSU. Grishin reportedly suffered a "serious" heart attack last summer, however, and how he fares politically from now on will depend in large measure on how speedily and completely he recovers.

At 59, Grishin has a reputation as a competent if somewhat uninspiring performer in the traditional apparatchik mold. He probably could be expected to move along the center of the path on policy issues, avoiding controversy whenever possible. His personal views on foreign affairs are difficult to identify because he rarely addresses these matters. Like Kirilenko, he would probably be cautious in dealing with the West.

Andropov, An Able Party Veteran, Directs KGB

Yury Vladimirovich Andropov, who runs the KGB, is more than an expert in intelligence and internal security. He has, in fact, spent much of his long career in straight party work, specializing in relations between the Soviet Communist Party and other ruling parties. He could in the future return to full-time party work.

Andropov is a man of intellectual stature. Nevertheless, he has no better than an outside chance of ever succeeding to the top party post. The KGB portfolio is a severe handicap for anyone who aims for the top. His colleagues would hesitate over the dictatorial potential inherent in any direct jump from the KGB to party chief, and the Soviet Union's image at home and abroad would suffer from too visible a secret police aura around the country's top leader.

By temperament, Andropov has seemed better suited to an important behind-the-scenes influence than to public political leadership. If he is still KGB Chairman when Brezhnev's successor is chosen, Andropov's support would be all but essential to the winning candidate.

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Polyansky

Dmitry Polyansky was abruptly dropped from his post as first deputy premier and named minister of agriculture in February 1973. Kremlin politics, as well as the poor harvest in 1972, was an important factor in his demotion. The move seemed designed to deflect from Brezhnev criticism for the almost disastrous crop failure.

Until this setback, Polyansky was one of the most influential and promising of the junior members of the Politburo. His strength derived primarily from his key position as first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, in which capacity he coordinated the work of numerous agencies dealing with agriculture. Polyansky's penchant for politicking and his tendency to generate rather than shun controversy undoubtedly contributed to his demotion.

Polyansky's demotion left a considerable power vacuum that has still not been filled. Fedor Kulakov, who is party secretary for agriculture, seems now to be the ranking party man in agriculture. But Kulakov has played a cautious role, apparently unsure whether Polyansky's star has fallen permanently.

Shelepin

Aleksandr Shelepin, once strong enough to appear a threat to General Secretary Brezhnev, has in recent years been clinging to a precarious political existence. Despite the marked decline in his status, Shelepin still bears watching. At 55, he is the youngest full member of the Politburo, and his aspirations seem undiminished.

Shelepin's ability to survive many reverses indicates that he retains significant support built up in a career as head of the Komsomol and of the KGB, and in other top party and government posts. Sometime in the mid-1960s Shelepin ran afoul of Brezhnev, and over the next few years Shelepin's offices and responsibilities were gradually peeled away.

Over the years Shelepin has demonstrated an ability and a readiness to shift his policy views to advance his political ambitions. Since Brezhnev unveiled his programs for consumer welfare at home and peace abroad at the 24th Party Congress in 1971, Shelepin has become one of his warmest supporters. The shift to the Brezhnev bandwagon suggests that Shelepin calculates that conspicuous support for the General Secretary offers the best hope for survival into the post-Brezhnev era.

Three Regional Leaders Likely to Move Up

Of the 23 full and candidate members of the ruling Politburo, seven represent regional or local interests. By usage or geographic importance, some Soviet regional posts are now more important than others, and the incumbents are thus in a good

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position to advance in the Soviet hierarchy. In Brezhnev's administration the top leaders in the Ukraine, Belorussia, and the Russian Republic seem especially important.

In May 1972, Vladimir Shcherbitsky became the first secretary in the Ukraine, the largest of the non-Russian republics. He is a close protege of Brezhnev. Both have political roots in the Dnepropetrovsk District of the Ukraine, and both maneuvered to bring down the previous Ukrainian first secretary, Petr Shelest. During this contest, Shcherbitsky adhered to a strong centrist, Moscow-oriented stance. Once he feels more secure in his position, however, Shcherbitsky may become more assertive with regard to Ukrainian interests.

Petr Masherov, first secretary of the party in Belorussia since 1965, has been an effective champion of scientific and technological innovation as a means of achieving economic and social progress. He has, at the same time, consistently stressed the need for ideological purity. Under Masherov, who is a candidate member of the Politburo, Belorussia is enjoying an economic boom. Masherov probably has an important ally in Moscow in Politburo member Kirill Mazurov who, like Masherov, is a native Belorussian. Mazurov, the odds-on favorite to succeed Premier Kosygin, is in a good position to advance the interests of both Belorussia and Masherov.

In July 1971, Mikhail Solomentsev was named premier of the Russian Republic, by far the largest of the 15 Soviet republics. His position as a regional leader is somewhat anomalous. The post of premier of the Russian Republic, with its capital in Moscow, is in many ways a national office. On the other hand, because party affairs for the republic are run from the national Central Committee and its Secretariat, Solomentsev has no direct party authority in the area he supposedly rules. Solomentsev's position entitles him to full membership on the Politburo, but he has been passed over several times. He may have high-level detractors or lack strong allies in the party hierarchy.

Younger Generation—Skill in Economic Management

The Soviet leadership includes three men under 55 years of age. All three began their careers in industry and later turned mostly to economic management. Their experience in this field may have an important influence on the future course of national policy.

Party secretary Konstantin Katushev, who is 46, spent his formative years in the Gorky Oblast of the Russian Republic. Under Katushev's aegis in the early 1960s, a new system of quality control was adopted by factories in Gorky. Experimentation with social development plans to go along with production plans at enterprises was also begun during Katushev's tenure in Gorky. Since 1968, Katushev has been working on relations with ruling communist parties abroad, an assignment he apparently owes largely to Brezhnev. As the focus of Soviet foreign policy has shifted to the West and detente, Katushev seems to have lost some of his prominence.

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Grigory V. Romanov, who is 51, is party chief of the Leningrad Oblast and a candidate member of the Politburo. Leningrad has become the recognized leader in amalgamating enterprises and scientific institutes into integrated industrial complexes capable of dealing independently with many operational and planning matters normally handled by Moscow. Last year, a party-government decree ordered the nationwide formation of production associations on the Leningrad model. Under Romanov, Leningrad officials have pushed for integrated economic and social planning at the regional level. In late 1971 Brezhnev made a special trip to Leningrad to give his endorsement to its work in regional planning.

Vladimir I. Dolgikh became Central Committee secretary for heavy industry in December 1972 after only three years as a regional party secretary. During his tenure as party boss of the sprawling Krasnoyarsk Kray in Western Siberia, Dolgikh prepared a ten-year plan for the comprehensive development of the kray that was singled out for praise by Brezhnev. Earlier, Dolgikh had been director of one of the first large enterprises to adopt the progressive economic reform system announced in 1965. Dolgikh believes that Siberian development has been hampered by the disjointed activities of central ministries, which fail to provide local services and social amenities along with new production facilities.

Collective Leadership

Soviet leaders work within a system of power sharing that gives a voice at the top policy-making level to all institutional and regional power centers. The system has allowed party boss Brezhnev to emerge as the first among equals, but it still imposes restraints upon his exercise of power. Brezhnev has been able to play off one regional or bureaucratic faction against another, but in so doing he has had to pay close heed to the views of the most powerful interest groups in order to advance his own position. Anyone who hopes to succeed him will have to do likewise.

The need to reconcile the many different positions is probably greater in the present Soviet regime than in previous ones. The result is a cautious, conservative leadership. The system of committee rule—"collective leadership" in Soviet parlance—has in general inhibited sudden or radical shifts in policy and has fostered stability within the top ranks of the leadership.

Although the political standing of certain Politburo members has changed sharply, removal of a Politburo member apparently requires wide consensus. There has, therefore, been very little attrition in this key group.

Brezhnev may have a freer hand than before in the matter of ensuring that the man who follows him, or who succeeds another senior leader, will be a man of his own choosing who will continue in broad outline his domestic and foreign policies. Unlike Khrushchev, who fretted about the succession question openly and endlessly,

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Brezhnev has not seemed to set out any clear line of succession. He may be content to put the matter off or to leave it in the hands of the Politburo and the major interest groups.

The senior members of the Politburo are getting on in years. Kosygin, Podgorny, Suslov, and Grechko are all in their seventies, and Brezhnev is 67. None of them enjoys robust health, and the chance of all of them leaving the political scene in rapid succession increases with time. If this were to happen, it might be difficult to achieve an orderly transfer of power.

Meanwhile, the most dynamic and outspoken younger members of the post-Khrushchev groups—Shelepin, Polyansky, and Shelest—have fallen victim to premature political ambitions. In the system of collective leadership, which requires caution and compromise, it is the more bureaucratic and self-effacing who flourish.

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Soviet Leaders and Succession

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GENERATIONS OF SOVIET LEADERS**Age 65 and over**

Members, Politburo

Brezhnev	67
Podgorny	71
Kosygin	70
Suslov	71
Kirilenko	67
Pelshe	75
Grechko	70
Ustinov	65
Ponomarev	69

Candidate members, Politburo

Age 55-64

Members, Politburo

Mazurov	60
Polyansky	56
Shelepin	55
Grishin	59
Kunayev	62
Shcherbitsky	56
Kulakov	56
Andropov	59
Gromyko	64
Demichev	56
Rashidov	56
Masherov	56
Solomentsev	60
Kapitonov	59

Candidate members, Politburo

Secretary

Age under 55Candidate member, Politburo
Secretaries

Romanov	51
Katushev	46
Dolgikh	49

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SOVIET SUCCESSION AND GENERATIONAL POLITICS

The Soviet leadership headed by Leonid I. Brezhnev will be a decade old this year. The coalition of leaders who deposed Khrushchev in October 1964 and redivided political power among themselves has remained remarkably stable. At the same time, the Politburo has grown unusually large, and the average age of its members is greater than ever before. Although there are no strong signs that the collective leadership is about to fall apart, its very longevity raises questions and creates problems concerning succession.

Past patterns of change in Soviet regimes suggest the rejuvenation of the top leadership may soon become an increasingly pressing matter. General Secretary Brezhnev is now 67. The leadership includes a number of younger officials who are in their late 50s or early 60s, but they hold offices of secondary importance (see chart). Time for them to have their turn at higher posts is beginning to run out. It was leaders in this age group who assumed power in 1953, when Stalin died at age 73, and in 1964 when Khrushchev was ousted at age 70.

Brezhnev Regime Unique

The generational problem is made more acute by an important difference between the composition of the Politburo today and that in 1953 or 1964. Stalin and Khrushchev, in their drive for power, expelled from the leadership most public figures of their own generation. They tended to rely politically on younger leaders whom they helped promote and who, therefore, owed them some loyalty.

As a result, under Stalin and Khrushchev the younger generation occupied more important posts and constituted a larger proportion of the Politburo than today. Thus younger leaders were already largely in place in 1953 and 1964, and succession involved, at least in the short term, little more than replacing the man at the top.

In the more collective atmosphere of the present regime, however, Brezhnev's contemporaries have held on to the top posts and preserved their numerical strength on the Politburo. At present, men in their late 60s and early 70s hold the party's top position (Brezhnev), two unofficial party positions of "second" secretary (Suslov and Kirilenko), the premiership (Kosygin), the presidency (Podgorny), as well as lesser offices represented on the Politburo.

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The Old Guard in charge...Suslov (71), Brezhnev (67), Podgorny (71) and Kosygin (70)

The next generation in waiting...Solomentsev (60), Kulakov (56), Shcherbitsky (56), Andropov (59), Grishin (59), Demichev (56), Kunayev (62) and Masherov (56)

This clique of older men, held together by a balance of power and self-interest, has been a great stabilizing factor in leadership politics. It has restrained Brezhnev in his attempts at self-aggrandizement, on the one hand, and, on the other, it has inhibited challenges to his position, which would threaten them all.

Although rivalry between Brezhnev and other senior leaders has surfaced periodically, the most serious challenge to his leadership came early in his tenure from one of the youthful leaders, Shelepin. Brezhnev relied heavily on senior leaders to deflect this threat. Brezhnev has advanced younger proteges like Shcherbitsky and Kunayev as chiefs of the Ukrainian and Kazakh parties, but they remain distant from the center of power. Moreover, Polyansky, another of Brezhnev's younger allies in the past, was demoted last year from his strategic post of first deputy premier to minister of agriculture. Among the officials promoted to the Politburo last year, Brezhnev's closest ally is Defense Minister Grechko, now 70.

In these circumstances, probable lines of succession are difficult to discern. It is true that Polyansky's demotion seems to clear the way for First Deputy Premier Mazurov eventually to succeed Kosygin, if he wishes. No one among the younger leaders, however, has a very strong claim to

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Brezhnev's job. The most prominent contenders, such as Shelepin and Polyansky, must overcome the political setbacks they have received. Those with less controversial careers, such as Kulakov and Grishin, suffer from lack of public exposure or narrowness of responsibility.

Prospects

Prolonged immobility in the top ranks increases the chances that change, when it comes, will involve many leaders. The illness or death of a senior leader, an ever-present possibility given their age and infirmities, could easily touch off a chain reaction.

Brezhnev is the youngest member of the senior group of leaders. This fact, and his strong political position, may encourage him to hope that he can survive a generational turnover within the leadership. If he considers such a turnover highly likely in the near future, he could build alliances with younger leaders and perhaps join them in an effort to ease out some of his senior colleagues. In the process he might even be able to add to his own titles either Podgorny's presidency or Kosygin's premiership, a frequently rumored ambition. In other words, Brezhnev might belatedly try to do what Stalin and Khrushchev did much earlier in their careers. This course, however, would be risky and would go against Brezhnev's conservative nature and style. It also would require repairing some personal and organizational relationships with the younger group of leaders.

The other senior leaders seem generally to have little ambition beyond preserving their own status. Kirilenko, who is the same age as Brezhnev, is probably the only one who entertains even a flicker of hope of ever becoming General Secretary. This kind of defensive outlook on the part of the senior leaders means that they probably are not eager to break ranks and, in collaboration with junior colleagues, to initiate a shake-up that would rend the fabric of their generational hegemony. They are likely to be spurred to such action only by a discernible threat to their individual and collective positions.

The problem for the younger leaders of today is not, as it was for Brezhnev and company in 1964, combining together to topple the party leader. The best they can hope for in the short run is simply to begin to pick away at the phalanx of aging superiors. Given Brezhnev's predominant position, the most realistic and logical course would be an alliance between Brezhnev and the younger officials against some of the older senior leaders. Indeed, such an alliance could be mutually beneficial. Political divisions among the younger leaders and various ties with the seniors, however, would be complicating factors.

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In the end, illness or death may help to break up the logjam at the top of the Soviet hierarchy. In this event, the particular circumstances and chain of events would greatly influence how the leaders survive and rearrange themselves.

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ANDREY KIRILENKO: THE MAN MOST LIKELY TO SUCCEED

Party Secretary Andrey Kirilenko is the best bet to succeed Brezhnev if the General Secretary leaves office in the not-too-distant future. Kirilenko is 67 years old, however, and the prospects of his moving up into the top party post will diminish with each additional year that Brezhnev, also 67, remains on the scene.

The son of a Russian artisan, Kirilenko was born in the southwestern part of the Russian Republic near the Ukraine. He completed a rural school at age 16, studied at a trade school, and worked for four years as a fitter and electrician. He graduated from an aircraft design institute in 1936, and worked as an aircraft design engineer for two years. He switched to political work as a local party secretary in the Ukraine in 1938. That same year, Brezhnev became party secretary in a nearby district and Khrushchev assumed the party leadership of the republic.



Kirilenko

Kirilenko spent the first year of the war as a political officer on the southern front before moving to Moscow to supervise an aircraft factory. He resumed political work in the Ukraine in late 1944, after its liberation, and succeeded Brezhnev as party boss of Dnepropetrovsk in 1950. He transferred to a party post in the Russian Republic in 1955, gained Central Committee membership in 1956, and became a candidate member of the Politburo in mid-1957. Kirilenko's career suffered an unexpected setback in 1961 when he lost his Politburo seat, but he bounced back six months later, becoming a full Politburo member and the number-two man in the Russian Republic's party organization.

Kirilenko is not known to have played an active role in Khrushchev's ouster in 1964, and his

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standing in the newly ordered leadership was relatively low. His general administrative competence, the absence of any display of dangerous political ambitions, and his past relationship with Brezhnev may have contributed to an improvement in his political position. He became a CPSU Secretary in 1966 and since then has steadily increased his real power and authority in the leadership.

Kirilenko has considerable say in personnel appointments within the party and has been in a position to build some personal political support. His record is relatively well-rounded, although focused more on industry than on agriculture. In recent years he has had quite a bit of experience in dealing with leaders of ruling and non-ruling foreign communist parties, but his contacts with other foreigners have been fairly limited.

Kirilenko's chances for succeeding Brezhnev depend primarily on his support among other members of the Politburo, particularly the "Ukrainians" who served together under Khrushchev in the Ukrainian party apparatus. One of these is President Nikolay Podgorny, who has shown a special interest in preserving the "old-school" ties with Kirilenko and the rest of the group, and probably would support Kirilenko. Minister of Agriculture Dmitry Polyansky, however, might withhold his support, particularly if Kirilenko had a hand in Polyansky's demotion from first deputy premier a year ago.

Kirilenko probably would have the support of Ukrainian First Secretary Vladimir Shcherbitsky and Soviet Defense Minister Andrey Grechko—the two Ukrainians added to the Politburo since Khrushchev's ouster. Shcherbitsky worked under Kirilenko during the early 1950s, and their association has probably remained a close one. Grechko, whose ties with Brezhnev and Kirilenko date from the early days of the war, seems to have remained on good terms with both men.

Trade union chairman Aleksandr Shelepin seems to share Kirilenko's views on many policy problems. First Deputy Premier Kirill Mazurov has worked closely with Kirilenko since 1965 in supervising industrial management, and the two men appear to have similar views in this area as well as in foreign policy.

It seems likely that, Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko and Kirilenko have, at a minimum, different perspectives and priorities at times—for example, in situations requiring a weighing of foreign policy equities against the stability of the Soviet political system. Nevertheless, Gromyko might prefer Kirilenko over other potential successors to Brezhnev, if only as a compromise candidate.

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Premier Aleksey Kosygin, one of two "independents" on the Politburo with sufficient seniority and prestige to avoid long-lived factional commitment in the internal power struggle, seems to have had little direct contact with Kirilenko. Kirilenko's responsibilities present the potential for friction with Kosygin, however, and he has differed with the premier on a number of questions—for example, by emphasizing moral rather than material incentives in spurring labor productivity, and by favoring a more militant approach toward "imperialist" countries. The two men have, however, arrived at a consensus of sorts on industrial management policy and economic planning. Both have endorsed production associations, and Kirilenko has supported the creation of a business management school—the Institute of National-Economic Management—which is another component of Kosygin's economic reform program.

Party Secretary Mikhail Suslov, the senior secretary who serves as Brezhnev's unofficial deputy, is the other "independent." With almost 27 years of continuous service in the Secretariat, Suslov has enormous prestige and considerable power. There is some evidence that he and Kirilenko have been competing for position and power, without necessarily opposing each other on policy matters. In fact, the two appear to be in general agreement on many domestic and foreign policy questions. Suslov, already 71 years old, probably would not put in a claim for the top post in a succession crisis, but he might use his influence to block Kirilenko's bid, if only to put a "Russian" at the head of the party for the first time since Lenin.

Arvid Pelshe, Chairman of the Party Control Committee, would probably play a minor role in a succession crisis because of his advanced age (he is 75), low political seniority, and weak personal power. He was party boss in Latvia until the 23rd Party Congress in 1966, when he was given his present party post and co-opted into the Politburo, apparently because of his status as an Old Bolshevik and as a token representative of the Baltic republics. His vote in a succession crisis would probably reflect the attitude of Suslov, with whom he apparently has a common outlook on many policy matters and to whom he reportedly is related by marriage.

Kazakhstan first secretary Dinmukhamed Kunayev, one of Brezhnev's most loyal boosters on the Politburo, seems to share Kirilenko's viewpoint on several issues and probably sees him as the most attractive candidate for the top party post. Party Secretary Fedor Kulakov, the regime's top-ranking agricultural expert since Polyansky's demotion, would probably prefer someone more sympathetic to the nation's farm lobby, but he might come to see Kirilenko as the least objectionable choice.

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Among the Politburo's candidate members, possible Kirilenko supporters include the following: Party Secretary Dmitry Ustinov, a quasi-“independent” who oversees defense-related industry; Russian Republic Premier Mikhail Solomentsev, Kirilenko's neighbor in the Urals during the late 1950s and a fellow supervisor of heavy industry; and Leningrad party boss Grigory Romanov, perhaps the regime's most enthusiastic booster of production associations.

As a successor to Brezhnev, Kirilenko would stand as a fairly orthodox Marxist-Leninist, and at least initially, he would be more cautious about dealing with the West. Kirilenko's public support of detente is infrequent and often conditional, and he has been in the forefront of those who champion the “Brezhnev Doctrine” of limited sovereignty. He was widely reported to have urged the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia despite the doubts expressed by Suslov, among others.

In his public statements, Kirilenko has come as close as any other top Soviet leader to advocate explicitly a dynamic foreign policy. He has termed aid to the Vietnamese and Arabs not only a “revolutionary duty,” but also a requirement of Soviet security. He has strongly criticized the Communist Chinese leadership and has defended the Soviet policy of attacking Peking's political and ideological positions, but he has not shut the door on an eventual reconciliation with China.

Kirilenko's relative militancy in foreign policy statements has its corollary in domestic policies, especially in the cultural and social spheres. On the question of improving labor productivity he puts greater emphasis on exhortation and persuasion than on material incentives. Kirilenko has revealed something of a pragmatic attitude toward economic management. His speeches on this theme have consistently promoted less dogmatic solutions to managerial problems.

Little is known about Kirilenko's real views on defense and strategic questions. His only public statement on SALT to date was a strictly pro forma assertion in April 1970 that the talks can produce results “if the United States makes an honest attempt to solve the problem at hand and does not try to achieve one-sided gains.” This cautious remark was consistent with Kirilenko's generally wary attitude toward the US. Such reservations no doubt underlie Kirilenko's repeatedly expressed opinion that a “dangerous” international situation makes it necessary to increase the USSR's defense capabilities.

Against this background, Kirilenko as General Secretary would probably be somewhat more imaginative in the field of domestic affairs than

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Brezhnev has been. In foreign affairs, Kirilenko's regime probably would not undertake any sharp departures from the course that has been followed under Brezhnev. Whatever his personal views on policy, as a compromise candidate, he could not move any further than his Politburo colleagues would allow. Any gradual shift in foreign policy under his leadership would probably be away from detente rather than toward it. Kirilenko's style of leadership would probably be less colorful and exuberant than Brezhnev's. Kirilenko gives the appearance of a modest, efficient administrator, not a politician who enjoys being on the hustings. The alteration in style would be in step with the regime's probable return to a more collective style of leadership following a change at the top.

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MAZUROV—HEIR APPARENT TO KOSYGIN

Among the relatively younger Soviet leaders, First Deputy Premier Mazurov at 60 has the clearest chance of one day assuming a top leadership post. Since 1965, Mazurov has served as Premier Kosygin's top government assistant on industrial matters. His claim to the premiership, whenever Kosygin relinquishes it, was considerably enhanced a year ago by the demotion of the other first deputy premier, Polyansky, to minister of agriculture.

Other recent signs also point to Mazurov's good standing. In November 1972, he delivered the Revolution Day speech for the second time in five years—putting him ahead of some peers who have never given it and of some senior leaders who have had the honor only once. Moreover, last July Mazurov read the main report on education at a session of the Supreme Soviet, an unusual public platform for a Politburo member.

Mazurov's well-rounded background and political acumen contribute to his prospects. Before assuming his present government post in March 1965,

he was for many years party chief in Belorussia. He has gained the reputation of being one of the more modern-minded members of this regime while still hewing to traditional ideas on some aspects of domestic and foreign policy. In his public statements, Mazurov seems to try to avoid polemics with his colleagues and to suggest innovations that can accommodate many interests. He has managed to be his own man among the leadership, on friendly terms with some but seemingly beholden to no individual or faction.

As a junior member of the Politburo, Mazurov has not played an important role in the formulation of foreign policy. His speeches usually follow the current party line, and indications of his personal



Mazurov

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views are scanty. In his most recent speech on December 19, Mazurov appropriately endorsed detente policies, pegging his support both to the prevention of nuclear war and to the establishment of "constructive business links" with the US and other capitalist states. More than most other leaders who have spoken recently, however, Mazurov dwelt long and vigorously on the inadmissibility of ideological and political concessions to the West. He was notably specific in supporting the CPSU's current "broad ideological offensive."

Mazurov has traveled widely outside the Soviet Union. In addition to Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Mongolia, he has also visited the United Kingdom, Sweden, the UN General Assembly in New York, Belgium, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Egypt, and Finland.

In a conversation with a senior US official during the Moscow summit in May 1972, Mazurov recalled as "extremely interesting" his 20-day visit to New York in 1961 to attend the UNGA. He also remarked that he was in favor of more frequent informal visits to the US by Politburo members, noting that since these men are heavily involved in managing the Soviet economy, they would be interested in visiting American factories and observing industrial management practices. The few Westerners who have met him have also found him easy to talk to, with an attractive sense of humor.

A Systems Advocate

Mazurov's avoidance of extremes and simplification make it difficult to give him a political label even in his principal area of responsibility as chief government overseer of industry. On some issues, his approach to economic questions appears designed to play both sides of the street. On the whole, however, he seems to be acting on a genuine appreciation of the complexity and interdependence of most economic matters. He has been ahead of other leaders in advocating a "systems approach" to various economic problems.

Mazurov's major task when he arrived in Moscow was to help Kosygin launch the 1965 economic reorganization. That reorganization involved the re-establishment of central ministries, including more than 40 production ministries. At the same time, more emphasis was to be given to worker incentives and to enterprise initiative in management. As the latter aspect of the program was compromised over the years, Mazurov, along with Kosygin, continued to defend it but not in an overly narrow or bureaucratic manner. Indeed, his penchant for a comprehensive approach to problems suggests some reservations about both the fragmentation of authority in specialized branch ministries and the efficacy of purely economic mechanisms. In recent years, he has supported the amalgamation of enterprises into production

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associations and the creation of agroindustrial complexes as ways to broaden the application of reform principles and to restructure management along more rational lines.

Although wedded to industry, and especially heavy industry, Mazurov has recognized the need for the "proportional development of the economy," that is, striking a better balance among heavy industry, light industry, and agriculture. In fact, his proposals over the years for developing consumer-oriented production and foodstuffs reveal his comprehensive approach to problems.

During Mazurov's leadership of the Belorussian party in the early 1960s, the republic was in the forefront of an attempt to popularize—under the rubric NOT (scientific organization of labor)—the concept of a team approach to problem-solving in the economy. During those years, an effort was made in the republic to employ this approach in the development of rural areas. As originally conceived, population centers destined for future development were to be selected according to economic criteria. These centers were to be provided with the infrastructure and social amenities found in urban areas—all in addition to modernizing agricultural production *per se*. The program never got fully under way, but echoes of it have reappeared in Mazurov's statements as first deputy premier.

Speaking in Leningrad in March 1967, Mazurov became the first and, for many years, the only Politburo member publicly to endorse a similar scheme—the Leningraders' social development plans in the industrial sphere. As he paraphrased their proposal, made at the party congress the year before, "each enterprise should, in addition to its production plan, have a unified complex plan for the comprehensive social development of the collective." These plans usually encompass such categories as job training, safety measures, housing, social amenities, and ideological education. The scheme attempts to break down the traditional barriers between segments of the economy. It also reflects, however, an orthodox belief in the efficacy of planning all things, even on a local level, and skepticism that "the unity of personal interests and the collective would be established spontaneously and automatically."

In a speech in Minsk in June 1970, Mazurov also became the first Politburo member to use publicly the term "systems approach." He cited the "*inter-branch* approach to management" (emphasis his) as a most important advantage of socialism over capitalism. "The systems approach," he said, should be applied to "the problem of increasing agricultural production in our nation at a more rapid pace." Elaborating, he noted the complexity of agricultural production and its dependence on the "efforts of many other

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branches of the national economy." Mazurov also advocated this approach "for the solution of the problem of supplying the public with an adequacy of consumer goods and cultural, household, and recreational goods."

Up from Belorussia

Mazurov was born into a peasant family on April 7, 1914, in the Gomel Oblast of Belorussia. There, in the 1930s, he graduated from a road and motor vehicle technical school and worked for a highway agency. After serving in the army from 1936 to 1938, Mazurov returned to Gomel to begin his party career in the youth organization, Komsomol. He saw combat duty in the army early in the war, was discharged after recovering from wounds, and then worked behind German lines as a Komsomol official in the Belorussian partisan movement.

Mazurov became first secretary of the Belorussian Komsomol after the war, when Aleksandr Shelepin in Moscow was responsible for top-level Komsomol appointments. He served in the Belorussian central committee apparatus and worked as a party leader in Minsk, rising from city second secretary to oblast first secretary. He served as Belorussian premier for the next three years. In 1956, Mazurov became Belorussian party chief, and he was made candidate member of the CPSU Politburo in 1957 when Khrushchev ousted the "anti-party group." His career struck a snag, however, when he clashed with Khrushchev over the latter's decentralization of agricultural management, as well as other aspects of Khrushchev's agricultural policies. He attained full membership on the Politburo only when he transferred to Moscow as first deputy premier in 1965, five months after Khrushchev's ouster.

His Kremlin Colleagues

Mazurov was promoted in 1965 over the head of Deputy Premier Polyansky, who had already been a Politburo member for five years. Seven months elapsed before Polyansky also gained the status of a first deputy. Mazurov assumed responsibility for the industrial side of the economy, Polyansky for the agricultural side, and the two alternated in deputizing for Kosygin. Rivalry would seem to have been inevitable in their positions. Their public speeches have revealed differences of emphasis on important issues, but they have not obviously engaged in disputes with one another.

Kosygin probably had an important say in bringing Mazurov to Moscow, where he oversaw the implementation of Kosygin's economic reforms. Until recently, Mazurov has been stingy with praise for Brezhnev. He does seem to share some common interests with Kirilenko and Shelepin. The

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three have shown interest in several of the same innovations in economic management (production associations and social development planning). Mazurov and Kirilenko share responsibility for the industrial economy in their respective government and party positions.

Keeping Options Open

Already well groomed for the premiership, Mazurov's lengthy party service makes him eligible, in the right circumstances, for party leadership. At present, he is hampered by not being on the party Secretariat, as this leaves him only limited influence in the Central Committee apparatus. On the other hand, he probably still enjoys support in the Belorussian party organization. Masherov, Belorussia's first secretary and a candidate member of the Politburo, followed closely behind Mazurov in his rise through the Komsomol and party leadership in Belorussia. This indication of political alliance is supplemented by evidence of social contacts with one another after Mazurov moved to Moscow.

Mazurov is the first ethnic Belorussian to attain full membership on the Politburo, and his nationality could count against his chances of becoming party boss. The Belorussians, however, are the most Russianized of the minority nationalities. Masherov enthusiastically supported Brezhnev's recent campaign against national individualism and self-interest, which contributed to the downfall of Ukrainian first secretary Shelest. The influence of Mazurov and Masherov, in fact, seems to have risen just as the unity of the "Ukrainian clique" in national politics has been dissolving.

There are signs that Mazurov has tried to maintain the stature of a party leader. Mazurov was widely rumored to have joined Shelepin in late 1969 or early 1970 in some sort of challenge to the drift then evident in economic

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Mazurov in the spring of 1970 harshly criticized inept handling of preparations for the Lenin centennial in April. Mazurov has been the only leader to elaborate publicly on Brezhnev's theme of victory through contacts, set forth in August 1973 at Alma Ata. Speaking last December, Mazurov urged propagandists to go from the defensive to the offensive against the bourgeois ethic, and to do so in a manner calculated to develop "more sophisticated, more consistent, flexible, and effective propaganda." In sum, he appears to be trying to identify with issues outside his specialty in politically advantageous ways.

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If Mazurov aspires to party leadership, he will have to overcome many hurdles and deficiencies in his political position. None is serious enough to rule it out, however, and he shows some signs of interest in the job. Perhaps the greatest element in his favor is that all other possible contenders for party leadership also labor under serious handicaps.

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GRISHIN, THE CAUTIOUS BUREAUCRAT

As party boss of the important Moscow city apparatus, Politburo member Viktor Grishin is in a good position to succeed ultimately to a top position in the leadership of the CPSU. Grishin reportedly suffered a "serious" heart attack last summer, however, and how he fares politically from now on will depend in large measure on how speedily and successfully he recovers.

Aside from his physical infirmities, Grishin is in an enviable spot vis-a-vis his peers. He enjoys the power and independence of other regional party leaders, and yet, as Moscow chief since 1967, he has had almost daily access to the senior members on the Politburo.

At age 59, Grishin has a reputation as a competent if somewhat uninspiring performer in the traditional apparatchik mold. Grishin probably


can be expected to move along the center of the path on policy issues, avoiding controversy whenever possible. As a regional party leader, Grishin has not had a major voice in foreign policy.

Although Grishin's recent promotions have coincided with upward turns in Brezhnev's political fortunes, he is not a Brezhnev protege. Rather, Grishin emerges as a consensus-oriented bureaucrat, acceptable to most other members of the political elite. In a regime that has seemed in recent years to stress the virtue of collective leadership, these attributes make Grishin a good candidate to move up in the central party hierarchy.



Grishin

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Grishin's Surprise Appointment

After 11 years as trade union boss, Grishin was unexpectedly designated as Moscow city first party secretary in June 1967. The appointment appears to have been the penultimate move in a fierce factional dispute between Brezhnev and the youthful challenger Aleksandr Shelepin.

At an important Central Committee plenum on June 20, the then-Moscow party boss, N. G. Yegorychev, sharply criticized some aspect of the Politburo's handling of the six-day Arab-Israeli war. (His specific charges are still uncertain.) Yegorychev reportedly had support from Shelepin. Brezhnev made a strong and apparently effective rebuttal, and Yegorychev was removed from his post a week after the plenum. Grishin replaced Yegorychev as head of the Moscow party apparatus, and in what seemed to be an act of calculated irony engineered by Brezhnev, Shelepin was given Grishin's old job.

Building a Power Base

The disestablishment of the Russian Republic party bureau in Moscow in 1966 had created a power vacuum of sorts, and Grishin, already a candidate member of the Politburo, moved to fill it.

He first replaced the personal followers Yegorychev had left behind. By 1971 three of the top five secretaries on the Moscow city party bureau had been removed, and new chiefs had been installed in 10 of the bureau's 13 departments.

At the 14th Party Congress in April 1971, Grishin was made a full member of the Politburo. The congress also called for the long-term development of Moscow as a "model city." Grishin has used the mandate to plug for more funds and greater autonomy in directing Moscow's development.

As leader of one of the largest industrial centers in the country, Grishin has had to address economic policy with increasing frequency. He has always

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been careful, however, to avoid controversial or innovative ideas. For example, Grishin began to endorse "production associations" only after the concept had gained general acceptance in the leadership.

Relationship with Brezhnev, Others

When Grishin assumed control in Moscow he had no career ties with Brezhnev or any other important political leader. It was not long, though, before he got his first opportunity to serve Brezhnev. In early 1968 the leadership, faced with disturbing liberalizing trends in Czechoslovakia and growing student restiveness at home, decided to tighten ideological controls. Brezhnev introduced the "vigilance" campaign with a major speech in March 1968 at a plenum of Grishin's Moscow City Party Committee.

Grishin's task was to spearhead the campaign to suppress or isolate those persons in the Moscow intellectual community who had condoned politically provocative stage productions or who had signed petitions on behalf of jailed writers. He moved with vigor, and the protest signature movement soon evaporated. [redacted]

[redacted] under the circumstances the actions taken by Grishin at the time were relatively moderate. More people could have been jailed, and the suppression could have been more severe.

There is little information on Grishin's relations with his Politburo colleagues. Among the lesser lights in the central party hierarchy there may be some antipathy toward him. Politburo candidate member Demichev, for example, rose out of the post of Moscow City first secretary, but now has fallen behind Grishin in party rank. Party Secretary Kapitonov, in charge of party organizational work, was Grishin's superior in the early 1950s, when Grishin worked in the Moscow provincial committee. These men may resent Grishin's recent ascendency.

Foreign Policy Views

Grishin's personal views on foreign affairs are difficult to decipher because he rarely addresses an appropriate forum. Like Kirilenko, he probably would be cautious in dealing with the West. He is certainly an ardent supporter of solidarity in the socialist camp, and his anti-Chinese credentials are well established.

In some of his recent foreign assignments, Grishin has demonstrated a notable lack of finesse. On a trip to Czechoslovakia one year after the invasion, his delegation was met by a barrage of rocks and jeers during a visit

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to a factory in Prague. Except for a one-day trip to Warsaw in late 1972, Grishin has not journeyed abroad since his trip to Rome.

Trouble Spots at Home

Although Grishin's career has not been marred by any clearly recognizable political setbacks, there have been some danger signals. On party organizational matters, Grishin, in an uncharacteristic move, appears to have taken a forward position on the controversial decision at the 24th Party Congress in 1971 to hold an exchange of party cards. The exchange can serve as a way to remove deadwood and revitalize the party ranks. Because of the high political stakes involved, most party leaders, including Brezhnev, have treated the matter with extreme caution, or have ignored it altogether in their public statements.

Early on, however, Grishin expressed his dissatisfaction with the slow pace of the exchange. In fact, he seems to have been recruiting a relatively large number of young people for party membership and responsible posts in the party. His position on this issue may bring him into conflict with some of his more conservative colleagues who continue to resist any large influx of new blood.

In 1965, Grishin, as chief of the trade unions, was politically embarrassed in the press debate that preceded the economic reform launched that year. One of the more controversial proposals being aired involved the use of "material incentives" (wages) to increase labor productivity. The concept was vigorously opposed by conservatives who preferred to rely on the conventional Soviet technique of "moral incentives" (competitions, banners, and medals).

The trade union's newspaper, *Trud*, presumably reflecting Grishin's thinking on the matter, gave heavy coverage to a local labor competition with high praise for the winners, thereby signaling its support for "moral incentives." *Pravda*, at that time edited by a notable "liberal" in Soviet terms, promptly published an exposé revealing that the outcome of the competition had been rigged in advance and that *Trud* knew about the deception. Grishin was obliged to issue an unprecedented, signed apology that was published in *Pravda*.

Education and Early Career

Like most top Soviet party and government leaders, Grishin received his only formal education in industrial technology. In 1937, at the age of 23, he graduated from a technical school in Moscow, specializing in railroad engineering. From there Grishin went to work in railroad administration in his home town of Serpukhov, near Moscow. By 1950 he had risen to the top party post in Serpukhov.

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ANDROPOV: MORE THAN JUST A KGB CHIEF

Yury Vladimirovich Andropov's present job, KGB Chairman, has tempted many Western observers to view him simply as a specialist in repression and espionage. This 59-year-old career party official also had substantial earlier regional party experience, however, and has served 13 years in other capacities in the Soviet leadership. He has a good chance of returning to other full-time party work.

Unlikely Party Boss

The top party post would seem at best an outside possibility for Andropov. Although his long party experience and apparently good working relationships with a broad range of leadership colleagues would work to Andropov's advantage in circumstances requiring a compromise candidate, his handicaps probably weigh more heavily. The KGB portfolio is a severe obstacle to any contender for the top party post. Leadership colleagues would be wary of the dictatorial potential inherent in any direct jump from the KGB to party chief even in the case of an Andropov, who has not been blatantly ambitious in the manner of his predecessors. The Soviet Union's image at home and abroad would suffer, probably to an unacceptable degree, from too visible a secret police aura around the country's top leader.

Andropov's party experience, although extensive, is narrowly grounded in relations with other ruling communist parties and related matters. He lacks direct supervisory experience in such key sectors as the economy. By temperament, Andropov has seemed more ambitious for, and better suited for, important behind-the-scenes influence than for public



Andropov

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political leadership. If Andropov is still KGB Chairman when Brezhnev's successor is chosen, his support would be all but essential to the candidate for party boss.

Likely Return to Party Foreign Affairs

It is quite possible, however, that Andropov will leave the KGB some time in the next few years to return to work on foreign party relations at a senior level. Already a full Politburo member, he could become a "senior secretary" by returning to the party secretariat that he left as a "junior" in 1967 for the KGB. At that time, Andropov had for the previous ten years headed the Central Committee's department for relations with ruling communist parties. Andropov appears to be one of the few intellectuals among Soviet leaders, and might be chosen to combine supervision of ideology or propaganda with some aspect of foreign affairs. Suslov, the party's senior ideologist and expert on international communism, is now 71 and reportedly in tenuous health. Andropov, who worked for Suslov from 1954 to 1967, is a strong candidate to inherit at least some of Suslov's responsibilities.

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Policy Views

Information on Andropov's policy views is fragmentary, but he has been seemingly consistent in defending two priorities closely related to his successive areas of responsibility: CPSU leadership of the international communist movement and Soviet internal security. Andropov's most recent speech, in Estonia on December 27, predictably contained a scathing rejection of Western interference in internal Soviet affairs.

Nonetheless, he also endorsed Soviet detente policies as contributing to elimination of the threat of nuclear war and creating the best conditions for social and economic development of the USSR. Additionally, Andropov has been more positive than any other full Politburo member who has recently spoken on the benefits achieved by Brezhnev's detente policies, saying that "never before has the foreign policy of the Soviet Union been so effective or produced such splendid results within so short a period." In sum, Andropov

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seems likely to support detente so long as it does not imperil internal security or Moscow's position in the socialist community.

Andropov seems to be a highly pragmatic manager who admires efficiency and results. These personality factors on occasion seem to modify his policy views. The net result is a complex man whose opinions and actions are not readily susceptible to neat classification as "hard-line" or "progressive."

One reflection of this complexity is Andropov's persistent reputation in Soviet intellectual and even dissident circles as a relative progressive and a reformer. He is reported to have argued in leadership councils against political show trials, calling them senseless and counterproductive, and to have been one of the leaders behind the decision to allow a safety valve of controlled Jewish emigration.

Under Andropov's leadership, however, the KGB, using a discriminating mixture of threats and arrests, has all but routed the Soviet dissidents without unleashing a "purge." Andropov's willingness to step out of the traditional KGB rut of uniformly crass repression, to employ subtler methods and shifting tactics, makes him a more formidable KGB Chairman, as well as a more effective walker of the detente-vigilance tightrope.

Highly cultured and intelligent, Andropov is generally quiet and unassuming in manner. He seems comfortable with responsibility, is a skilled administrator, and is as demanding of himself as of his subordinates. Reportedly he knows some English. Although widely traveled in Eastern Europe and communist Asia, Andropov's only known travel to non-communist areas was to Somalia in July 1972.

Political Ties

Any CPSU party head must secure his position by choosing a loyal KGB Chairman. In 1967, Brezhnev chose Andropov, ousting Chairman Semichastny because of his greater loyalty to Brezhnev's then principal rival, Shelepin.

Andropov also seems to have the kind of trust and broad support among other leaders that, in a collective, is almost as essential to a KGB Chairman as the confidence of the party head. Suslov was probably Andropov's primary earlier patron. There is little information on their current relationship, but there is no evidence that they do not still find basic common ground.

Andropov's acquaintance with Kirilenko, Brezhnev's unofficial party deputy and likeliest short-term successor, conceivably goes back to the

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mid-1930s, when both were in Rybinsk, although attending different technical schools.

Andropov's promotion to full Politburo membership in the spring of 1973 was tied to other considerations, including Brezhnev's desire to strengthen his foreign policy support and some other, still unclear, political tradeoffs. Andropov had outranked Gromyko and Grechko until last April, when their promotions gave them equal status, and also indirectly advanced the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense to a party bureaucratic standing equal to that of the KGB.

Impact on the KGB

The principal effect of Andropov's KGB has been closer party-KGB relations. The first KGB chairman since Beria to sit in leadership councils, Andropov, unlike Beria, has the outlook of a party administrator rather than a policeman. He has brought party control and a party leadership viewpoint directly to bear on KGB management. Several of the new KGB deputy chairmen appointed in recent years have been party, rather than KGB, officials. By the same token, Andropov probably also brings some degree of KGB perspective directly into the Politburo, with corresponding enhancement of the KGB's institutional influence in that body.

Budapest and Other Influences

Born on June 15, 1914 in the north Caucasus area, Andropov completed a technical education in Rybinsk and then became a Komsomol organizer in Yaroslavl Oblast. His Komsomol work took him in 1940-41 to the Karelo-Finnish Republic, where he headed the party youth organization. During most of World War II he organized partisans behind the German lines, probably along the Finnish frontier in the Murmansk area. His partisan experience is another common bond with Suslov, who directed this activity in the north Caucasus area, with Pelshe (Latvia), and Mazurov and Masherov (Belorussia).

From 1944 to 1951, Andropov was again in formal party work in the Karelo-Finnish Republic, first as second secretary of the city of Petrozavodsk and then of the whole republic.

In 1951, Andropov went to Moscow and into the Central Committee apparatus. He simultaneously attended the Higher Party School. In 1953 he was posted to Budapest, becoming ambassador there in 1954 and remaining through the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. Information on Andropov's personal role in the Hungarian Revolution, however, is fragmentary and

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conflicting. In 1957 he returned to Moscow as head of the Central Committee Bloc Department (relations with ruling parties). There he served until going to the KGB a decade later. He joined the leadership as a party secretary in November 1962. In June 1967, shortly after moving to the KGB, he was transferred from the secretariat to become a candidate Politburo member.



KGB Headquarters

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DMITRY POLYANSKY: A POLITICAL PROFILE

On February 3, 1973, Dmitry Polyansky was abruptly dropped from his post of first deputy premier and appointed minister of agriculture. This was a severe setback to his ambitions to succeed Kosygin as premier. Not only Kremlin politics, but also the previous year's poor harvest were probably important factors in his demotion. His demotion seemed designed to deflect from Brezhnev criticism for the almost disastrous crop failure.

Before 1973, Polyansky had been one of the most influential and promising of the junior members of the Politburo. His strength derived from his key position as first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers—in which capacity he coordinated the work of the numerous agencies dealing with agriculture—and from his excellent and extensive political connections.

A Russified Ukrainian, Polyansky was one of a group of Soviet leaders, including Brezhnev, Kirilenko, Podgorny and Grechko, who got their start in the Ukraine under Khrushchev and who allied themselves with him during his rise to power in Moscow. Although they did not always agree among themselves on policy questions, they formed the core of Brezhnev's political support after Khruschev's ouster.



Polyansky (c) receives Australian Deputy Prime Minister McEwen (l)

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Polyansky's penchant for politicking and his tendency to generate rather than shun controversy undoubtedly contributed to his difficulties. Whether Brezhnev engineered or merely acquiesced in Polyansky's demotion, the party boss ultimately benefited, and relations between the two men now appear to be somewhat strained. This year's excellent harvest clearly saved Polyansky his Politburo seat for the moment, but Brezhnev got the public credit.

The present arrangement regarding Polyansky is highly unstable with many loose ends. Polyansky long dominated the agricultural sphere—at least behind the scenes—and his demotion left a considerable power vacuum that has not been filled. The position of first deputy premier that he lost is still vacant. Fedor Kulakov, the party secretary for agriculture and once Polyansky's protege, is now seemingly the ranking agriculturalist in the leadership. Kulakov has made clear his allegiance to Brezhnev, but has otherwise played a cautious role, apparently unsure whether Polyansky's star is rising or falling. A government reorganization, rumored to be in the works, could resolve the issue.

The Man

Polyansky is not a faceless bureaucrat; he is one of the more colorful members of the leadership. A driving authoritarian politician, his ambition is leavened by an open outgoing manner, a mocking wit, and a tendency to say what he thinks. Foreigners who have met him have found him to be a highly competent and complex individual: suspicious, sensitive to his own prestige and importance, domineering, impetuous, gregarious, and talkative.

Born Under the Right Star

Polyansky puts great stock in the fact that he was born on the day of the Bolshevik revolution, November 7, 1917. He grew up in the Ukraine and attended an agricultural institute there in the late 1930s. After graduating, he left the republic and though he kept in touch with many of his former Ukrainian associates, his subsequent career was primarily in the Russian Republic and then at the national level.

He served as party boss in several key grain-growing districts, and in 1958, thanks to his loyal support for Khrushchev against the anti-party group, he was named premier of the Russian Republic and won a seat on the Politburo. Four years later he was appointed a deputy to Kosygin and in this capacity became the government's top agricultural administrator.

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Polyansky's approach to agricultural problems has always seemed basically pragmatic, mixing a concern for economic considerations with a healthy regard for political realities. He was, for example, an advocate of buying grain from abroad and was closely involved in the first big Soviet purchases in 1963.

Yet, Polyansky had been as responsible as anyone for some of the ill-advised agricultural practices at that time, abetting Khrushchev in his determination to find cheap, short-cut remedies. Polyansky came close to losing his job as a result. He participated in the coup against Khrushchev and expressed great bitterness in later years at the damage Khrushchev did to the agricultural sector in the last years of his tenure as party boss.

Champion of Agricultural Interests

Polyansky was evidently the chief architect of the ambitious agricultural program that Brezhnev sponsored in 1965 soon after Khrushchev's ouster. Through high investments and a reform of planning and procurement mechanisms, the program sought to modernize agriculture and put it on a sound financial footing—to undo the legacy from the Stalin years when the agricultural sector was milked to finance the development of heavy industry.

Polyansky was a staunch and outspoken champion of this program. When other leaders, including Brezhnev, flagged in their support, Polyansky spoke out publicly in its defense. In an all-but-unprecedented move in late 1967, shortly after a decision had been taken to cut back on agricultural investments, Polyansky wrote an article in the leading Soviet theoretical journal, warning of the dangers of slighting that sector.

Polyansky's most serious and long-drawn-out feud over agriculture appears to have been with Gennady Voronov, who succeeded him as premier of the Russian Republic in 1962. Among other points of disagreement, Voronov held that a radical reform in the organization of labor and in the system of wages on the farms would reduce the need for the high investments in agriculture that Polyansky proposed. As the argument wore on, both were driven to somewhat ridiculous extremes. Polyansky was ultimately the victor in this controversy. Voronov was dismissed from the premiership in July 1971 and dropped from the Politburo in early 1972. The feud caused much bad blood, a fact that may not have helped Polyansky later when the harvest failed.

Polyansky's friendly relations with Kirilenko and others like Demichev made it easy for him to smooth over policy differences with them, but this was not the case with Voronov. Polyansky seems to have had nothing but

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scorn for him and repeatedly dismissed his proposals as "nonsense." Polyansky has expressed the same outspoken intolerance towards others he has considered either wrong or of no consequence.

Polyansky Dabbles in the Arts

Polyansky's primary concern has been with the agricultural sector, but there have been persistent reports over the years of his interest in cultural affairs. He may have had some official responsibilities for this area as part of his duties as deputy premier. In contrast to his generally pragmatic and flexible approach to economic matters, Polyansky is thoroughly conservative in his attitude toward the arts, perhaps because he recognizes there is a constituency holding such views. Furthermore, his name has been linked with the more reactionary Slavophile movements and with various anti-Semitic and Stalinist writers.

...and in Foreign Affairs?

This same message seemed implicit in Polyansky's appointment as minister of agriculture last spring. "Concentrate your able talents on agriculture and stay out of their affairs." There were hints in the previous year that Polyansky may have flirted with those in the central committee who had reservations about Brezhnev's detente policies.

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SHELEPIN: A POLITICAL PORTRAIT

Aleksandr Shelepin, once in the running to become the regime's strong man, has in recent years been clinging to a precarious political existence. Despite his reduced status, Shelepin still bears watching. His ambition and abilities seem unimpaired, and at 55, he is the youngest full member of the Politburo.

Shelepin's success in surviving many reverses indicates that he retains significant support built up during his career as head of the Komsomol, head of the KGB, and ultimately as holder of top party and government posts. His policy preferences seem to have had an important influence, even in recent years, on the direction of policy adopted by the leadership.

The high point in Shelepin's career came in November 1964 following Khrushchev's ouster, when he attained membership on the Politburo. He was the only Politburo member to also hold important executive posts in both the party (Central Committee secretary) and the government (deputy premier).

Shelepin reportedly used his strong position to challenge Brezhnev for the leadership of the party sometime in 1965, but he was thwarted by Brezhnev's political skill and, very likely, by the other leaders' fear of his ambition. Over the next few years, the layers of Shelepin's offices and responsibilities were gradually peeled away. When in June 1967, Moscow party boss Yegorychev, an ally of Shelepin, criticized the leadership's handling of the Arab-Israeli crisis, Shelepin was removed from the party Secretariat and made chief of the trade unions, a position that usually has not merited Politburo membership. At the 24th Party Congress in 1971, Shelepin was listed last (11th) among incumbent leaders, a fall from 7th place at the 1966 Congress. The two leaders, Voronov and Shelest, who were ranked just ahead of Shelepin in 1971 have since been forced out of the Politburo.

The Komsomol and KGB

Shelepin has demonstrated unusual ability and readiness to shape his policy to serve his political ambitions. The resultant shifts have frustrated attempts to pin a political label on him, although he has the reputation of advocating modern, efficient management as well as traditional Soviet principles such as centralized control.

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Shelepin

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Shelepin was born in Voronezh, RSFSR, in 1918, the son of a railroad worker. He is one of the few Soviet leaders with a background in social sciences, having studied at the Moscow Institute of History, Philosophy, and Literature in the late 1930s. He served in the army in the Russo-Finnish War of 1939-40 as a political education instructor and a squadron commander. During World War II he began his career in the Komsomol in Moscow and reportedly led a partisan group near Moscow.

Shelepin rose through the Komsomol hierarchy and in 1952 became its first secretary, a position he held until 1958. In this post he was able to develop ties with a whole generation of future leaders throughout the country. Shelepin still retained considerable influence over the Komsomol in the late 1950s and early 1960s, when the organization and its newspaper were open to new ideas and freer discussion of political and social questions. For example, the Komsomol undertook to popularize sociology and the use of questionnaires and polls.

In 1958, Shelepin worked briefly in the Central Committee apparatus before being appointed chief of the KGB. This post contributed to his sinister image abroad. In fact, however, Shelepin took strenuous measures to bring the secret police under closer party and government supervision and to end its role as an instrument of political terror. Shelepin left the KGB in 1961 after being elected to the party Secretariat. The next year he was named deputy premier and chairman of the watchdog Party-State Control Committee.

The Voice of Neo-Stalinism

In his drive for power in the mid-1960s, Shelepin adopted a neo-Stalinist program that in many ways suited the post-Khrushchev climate. He appeared to be in league with those who favored administrative fiat in directing the economy, cultural and ideological retrenchment, rapprochement with China, and hostility toward the West. Brezhnev, however, took the wind out of Shelepin's sails by adopting a conservative tack himself.

Brezhnev also moved to erode Shelepin's organizational strength. In December 1965, Shelepin was relieved of his post on the Council of Ministers and dismissed as head of the Party-State Control Committee, which was dismantled. In the Secretariat, Shelepin momentarily gained responsibility for the cadres sector, but was forced to turn this over to Kirilenko in April 1966. He ended up with the relatively minor responsibility of overseeing the consumer goods industry.

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Shelepin Changes His Colors Again

Following his demotion in 1967, Shelepin seemed to begin to moderate his conservative views, perhaps recognizing that he needed new constituencies and new issues. For example, in May 1968, Shelepin's trade union newspaper published a favorable review of a controversial play, *Bolshevik*. The play examined the Bolshevik leaders' decision, with its portentous meaning for Soviet history, to introduce the Red Terror after an attempt against Lenin's life. The play shocked and aroused Moscow audiences still deeply concerned about Stalin's crimes.

According to most reports, Shelepin was among those who opposed the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1968. As trade union chief, Shelepin became active and effective in promoting closer ties with foreign trade unions, particularly those of Western Europe.

Shelepin continued to show interest in consumer welfare even after he lost responsibility for it on the Secretariat in 1967. Although Shelepin apparently opposed the economic reform of 1965, his economic outlook seemed to become somewhat more flexible by the end of the decade. According to reports in 1970 and 1972, he joined such leaders as Mazurov, Suslov, and Kirilenko in criticizing drift in economic policy and calling for more modern methods of management. He gave early support to the organization of production associations, which was decreed last year.

Shelepin Casts His Lot With Brezhnev

Since Brezhnev unveiled his programs of consumer welfare at home and peace abroad at the 24th Party Congress in 1971, Shelepin has become, at least in public, one of the warmest supporters of the General Secretary and his policies. Speaking just after the Congress, Shelepin outdid other leaders in praising the new deal for consumers. In January 1973 he credited Brezhnev with successes in detente and became the first Politburo member, apart from Brezhnev's protege Kunayev, to refer to the General Secretary as head of the Politburo. During the leadership's round of speechmaking late last year, Shelepin heaped praise on Brezhnev and was more enthusiastic than even Brezhnev on many specific aspects of detente.

Shelepin's current public views probably stem from his precarious position and a judgment that ostentatious backing of an increasingly secure Brezhnev and his policies offers the best hope for survival. Yet, Shelepin does seem to have a knack for anticipating the direction of policy. The change of heart he showed in the late 1960s suggests that he may genuinely believe in the new directions in policy.

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In recent years Shelepin's contacts with Westerners have been largely confined to trade union leaders. He makes widely varying impressions on foreigners he meets. He often comes across as heavy-handed in meetings with foreign communist party and communist trade union officials.

By contrast, an American trade union official who met Shelepin in Moscow in June 1968 described him as a good listener with a friendly personality and a sense of humor. Shelepin avoided communist cliches and jargon and related a joke at the expense of the Chinese. He expressed regret and amazement over the assassination of Robert Kennedy, remarking that "these are the methods of Stalin."

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REGIONAL LEADERS IN THE POLITBURO

Of the 23 full and candidate members on the ruling Politburo, seven represent regional or local interests. Their Politburo status exposes them to a certain extent to national policy concerns and issues. As a matter of practical politics, however, these regional leaders find themselves championing the interests of their own constituencies, especially with regard to the continuing scramble for development funds and resources.

Shcherbitsky in the Ukraine

In May 1972, Vladimir Shcherbitsky became first secretary of the Ukraine, bringing the largest of the non-Russian republics under the control of a close protege of Brezhnev. Both men have political roots in the Dnepropetrovsk district of the Ukraine, where they had openly maneuvered against the previous first secretary, Petr Shelest. During this contest, Shelest sought to shore up his position in the republic by echoing some of the views of the more nationally minded element in the Ukrainian party, while Brezhnev and Shcherbitsky moved steadily toward a tougher, more centrist, Moscow-oriented stance.

At the same time, Shelest began to challenge Brezhnev more openly on policy issues, such as detente with West and the domestic consumer program, presumably in hopes of attracting support from other quarters. He also began defending the interests of his republic constituency even more vigorously. At the 24th party congress in the spring of 1971, Shelest criticized Moscow's policy of heavy investment in oil and gas projects in Siberia, claiming that the Ukrainian coal industry was stagnating.

It was at the party congress that Brezhnev moved decisively to weaken Shelest's position. Shcherbitsky, then Ukrainian premier, was promoted from candidate to full membership on the Politburo. It is very unusual for both top posts in any republic to be held by full members of the Politburo, and it was apparent that either Shelest or Shcherbitsky would have to go.

The climax came at the Central Committee meeting on the eve of the Moscow summit in May 1972. The immediate cause for Shelest's transfer from the Ukraine to a deputy premiership in Moscow was probably his opposition to going through with the summit, although he had already laid himself open to charges of nationalism by his conspicuous defense of Ukrainian special interests. A year later Shelest was ousted from the Politburo.

The campaign against Shelest has colored Shcherbitsky's policies. He has supported detente and the consumer program. He publicly refuted Shelest's criticism of investment in Siberia. In the past year Shcherbitsky has quietly removed officials in the Ukraine closely identified with Shelest and has acted to muffle manifestations of nationalism in the republic. Once he feels more secure in his position, however, he could become more independent in his views and pay more attention to Ukrainian interests.

Shcherbitsky, who is 56, has not traveled abroad as much as some other republic leaders, but he is one of the few to have visited the US. He represented the Ukraine at a special session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1967. Like most Soviet leaders, Shcherbitsky received his only formal education at a technical school, a chemical engineering institute in the Dnepropetrovsk area, from which he graduated in 1941.

Masherov in Belorussia

The Kremlin is seeking to strengthen the country's economic base while maintaining close internal control. In its quest for these twin goals, it has an articulate and dynamic spokesman in Petr Masherov, first party secretary of the Belorussian Republic and a candidate member of the Politburo.

Masherov has consistently championed scientific and technological innovation as a means to economic and social progress in Belorussia, but has also stressed the need for ideological purity. In particular, he has warned against the dangers of "consumerism," noting that this tends to sap the party's elan and make man a slave to his material possessions.



Shcherbitsky

Masherov has taken a strong centrist view on the nationality question, favoring a more rapid economic integration of the Soviet republics and the blurring of all national and cultural distinctions. Masherov's frequent references to the "new Soviet man" reflect the regime's fundamental premise that, in time, the USSR's multinational population can be molded into a homogeneous citizenry dedicated to advancing the interests of the whole Soviet state.

The absence of nationalist pressures in Belorussia and the long-standing political rivalry between the Belorussian and Ukrainian party organizations are important reasons for Masherov's pro-centrist stand. His criticism in late 1972 of the efforts of some local leaders to favor their own republics at the expense of the national interest was clearly directed against Shelest. It was one of the sharpest public attacks in the campaign against the former Ukrainian party boss, and was even more sweeping than Brezhnev's in its condemnation of local nationalism.

Under Masherov, Belorussia is experiencing an economic boom, largely because Moscow is investing more in the republic, including construction of a number of large petrochemical complexes. In order to bolster his argument for more money while not laying himself open to the charge of nationalism, as did Shelest in the Ukraine, Masherov has stressed the importance of these industrial complexes for the USSR as a whole. He has emphasized, moreover, that labor is recruited from all the Soviet nationalities and that construction funds and materials are drawn from all the republics.

Masherov's personal relationship with Brezhnev is not clear. He has enthusiastically supported some of the General Secretary's programs, but has been cool or even hostile to others.



Masherov

Masherov probably has an important ally in Moscow in Politburo member and First Deputy Premier Kirill Mazurov who, like Masherov, is an ethnic Belorussian. Masherov followed closely behind Mazurov in his rise through the Komsomol and party leadership in Belorussia. When Mazurov moved to Moscow in 1965, Masherov succeeded him as the republic's first party secretary. It is true that Masherov, in his efforts to strengthen his personal control over the Belorussian party organization, has removed some of Mazurov's close associates, thus creating the potential for some strain between the two. Nevertheless, Mazurov is the odds-on favorite to succeed Premier Kosygin, and is in a good position to advance Belorussian interests. The influence of both Mazurov and Masherov, in fact, seems to have been rising just as the unity of the "Ukrainian clique" in national politics has been dissolving.

Since he became Belorussian party chief, Masherov has visited a number of European countries. Now 56, he attended a teachers' college in Belorussia in the late 1930s and for a short period before the war taught physics and mathematics in a secondary school.

Solomentsev in the RSFSR

In July 1971, Mikhail Solomentsev was named premier of the Russian Republic (RSFSR), the largest of the 15 Soviet republics. He replaced one of Brezhnev's political adversaries, Gennady Voronov, who had quarreled with Brezhnev over agriculture investment policies. Solomentsev may have had early ties to Suslov and Shelepin, but he now seems to be playing a relatively independent role. The RSFSR premier is usually entitled to full membership in the Politburo. Solomentsev, a candidate member since 1971, has missed several opportunities to be promoted. This may mean either that he has some high-level detractors or that he lacks strong allies in the party hierarchy.

Solomentsev has had broader experience than most of the other republic leaders. He has served in a high party post in another republic (Kazakhstan), and for five years was responsible for heavy industry in the CPSU Secretariat. Westerners who have met with him say he exudes ruthless self-confidence.

Nevertheless, Solomentsev's position as a "regional" leader is somewhat anomalous. The post of RSFSR premier, with a seat in Moscow, is in many ways a national office. The Russian Republic is twice the size of all the other

republics combined and contains over half the population of the USSR. Solomentsev administers an RSFSR government bureaucracy almost as vast and complex as Premier Kosygin's USSR Council of Ministers.

On the other hand, Solomentsev has no direct party authority over the area he supposedly rules. Party affairs for the RSFSR are run from the CPSU Central Committee and its Secretariat. The absence of a separate party organization for the Russian Republic results in part from the central leadership's desire to avoid concentration of power in the hands of one man. For Solomentsev, it means that any number of central Politburo leaders can, and often do, meddle in the affairs of the RSFSR.



Solomentsev

Solomentsev, like Shelest and Shcherbitsky in the Ukraine, must deal with nationalism in both its emotional and economic aspects. Russian national sentiment is an important element in Moscow's intellectual life, and long-established regional rivalries must be taken into account. Solomentsev has, for example, promoted the development of Siberia in the eastern RSFSR. But he cannot do this too vigorously without antagonizing important political and economic interests in the heavily industrialized area of the western part of the republic.

Solomentsev, who is 60, has begun to travel more frequently since being named RSFSR premier. Last December he went to Japan to open an exhibit devoted to Siberia. Solomentsev is of Russian descent. He attended a polytechnical institute in Leningrad, graduating in 1940.

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THREE PROMINENT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE YOUNGER GENERATION

The Soviet leadership includes three members under 55 years of age: party secretaries Konstantin Katushev, 46; Vladimir Dolgikh, 49; and candidate member of the Politburo Grigory Romanov, 51. They represent the first contingent of a third generation of leaders on the scene behind the top officials, all of whom are over 65, and the middle-level officials, generally between 55 and 65. As a group, they cannot be considered Brezhnev's men, although he seems to have had a hand in the rapid rise each of them has experienced.

The three began their careers in industry and have devoted much of their later party careers to economic management problems. In this field they have been innovative and have pushed several of the organizational and management schemes now coming into vogue. This may say something about the shape of the leadership to come.

The present regime scrapped a regional organization of economic management in 1965 in favor of a strictly centralized branch system. Yet, in promoting these three young regional leaders who have been successful in the economic field, the regime has advanced advocates and practitioners of more regional control. These regional leaders have stressed the importance of improving local infrastructure and welfare in conjunction with the production tasks that are the focus of central ministries, and they have also used sociological studies (traditionally suspect in the Soviet Union) to bolster their programs.

Katushev

Since April 1968, Konstantin F. Katushev has been the Central Committee secretary responsible for relations with ruling Communist parties abroad. His earlier career did little to prepare him for this assignment, which he apparently owes largely to Brezhnev.

Katushev was born and made his career in Gorky, RSFSR. He served in the army at the front late in World War II. In the late 1940s, he began studies at the Gorky Polytechnical Institute, where he majored in automotive technology. In 1951 he went to work at the Gorky Automotive Plant, then the army's biggest supplier of tanks. He rose through various positions as a designer and party worker at the plant to become secretary of the plant's party bureau in 1961 and first secretary of Gorky city in 1963.

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In December 1965, Brezhnev visited Gorky to supervise Katushev's promotion to first secretary of the oblast. Until then, Brezhnev had not appeared to be involved in Katushev's career, and this remains the only time Brezhnev, as party leader, has presided over a promotion at the oblast level. Although there were signs in the central press of opposition to Katushev's advancement, Brezhnev returned to Gorky in January 1967 to give the oblast the Order of Lenin and his praise.

Under Katushev's aegis in the early 1960s, a progressive system of quality control and improvement was adopted by factories in Gorky. The program apparently originated in defense-related electronics enterprises but was soon picked up by other industries, including the Gorky Automotive Plant. At the party congress in 1966, Katushev noted the success that the 1965 economic reform was meeting in Gorky. A year later, however, he associated himself with a proposal to establish in Gorky tight party control over the plant managers' incentive funds instituted by the reform.

Katushev's support of the principle of party control, however, was not wholly orthodox. In 1965 the Gorky city party committee established a public institute of sociological research to provide more scientific studies of economic and social problems. Gorky also early began experimenting with social development plans at enterprises to accompany production plans. These plans usually encompass worker training, safety and health measures, housing, recreation facilities, and ideological education.

Katushev assumed his current responsibilities for bloc affairs at a time when Brezhnev was supervising this aspect of foreign relations more closely than others. At the Central Committee meeting that promoted Katushev in April 1968, Brezhnev laid down an uncompromising ideological line in reaction to the liberal trends in Czechoslovakia. Katushev was heavily involved in reasserting Soviet control in Czechoslovakia after the August 1968 invasion. As the focus of Soviet foreign policy has shifted to the West and to detente, Katushev has appeared to lose some of the prominence he enjoyed in the late 1960s.

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Romanov

After seven years as second secretary of Leningrad Oblast, Grigory V. Romanov became the party chief there in September 1970, replacing V. S. Tolstikov who left as ambassador to Peking. In April 1973, at the Central Committee meeting preceding Brezhnev's trips to Bonn and Washington, Romanov was elected a candidate member of the Politburo.

With these moves, Brezhnev apparently reached accommodation with a previously rather hostile Leningrad party organization. Leningrad regained the representation on the Politburo that it enjoyed under Stalin, and also gained recognition and support from Brezhnev for some of its pet schemes in the field of economic management and party work. At the same time, Romanov departed from Tolstikov's silent treatment of Brezhnev and began giving the General Secretary generous praise.

Romanov's political roots are in the party organization, which has a reputation for being progressive on economic matters and reactionary on cultural and ideological questions. After serving in the army during World War II, he worked as designer in the Leningrad ship-building industry and graduated from the Leningrad Ship-building Institute. He began full-time party work in 1954 and moved up the city and oblast party hierarchy until he became Tolstikov's deputy in January 1963.

**Romanov**

Tolstikov ran afoul of Brezhnev in 1970, particularly over foreign policy, just when Brezhnev was taking his first steps in the direction of detente. In June, Leningrad authorities foiled an attempt by Jews to hijack an airplane. A wave of arrests of Jews around the country followed, and the would-be hijackers were tried, with two receiving death sentences. This brought an outcry from the West. In December, presumably as a result of intervention of the leadership, the death sentences were commuted, and the next year saw the beginning of freer emigration of Jews.

Romanov's personal involvement in these matters is unknown.

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As Leningrad party boss, he has maintained rigid cultural and social discipline, but apparently without complicating Brezhnev's foreign policy. Romanov, however, worked closely with Tolstikov in developing his economic programs and continues to be their champion.

Leningraders greatly resented the abolition of regional economic units in 1965 and the re-establishment of central production ministries. In the economic schemes they have advanced, Leningrad leaders have tried to improve their ability to integrate the activities of the central ministries in the region and to become better masters of their own house.

Leningrad has become the recognized leader in amalgamating enterprises and scientific institutes into associations and in formulating social development plans at the factory, city, and oblast level. At the party congress in 1971, Romanov stated that further development of associations would "sharply reduce the number of projects subject to control from" Moscow and would free central bodies from having to deal with many operational questions. Under Romanov, Leningrad officials have worked not only to achieve integrated comprehensive planning within the oblast, but also to extend their influence over economic affairs in the surrounding region of the country.

These efforts have been closely directed by the oblast party committee, which has developed several new organizational forms to enhance party supervision over the economy. At the party congress, Romanov mentioned their experience in creating unified party organizations in production associations, enlarging party committees in large enterprises, and granting such committees the rights of a city ward committee. Sociologists have been enlisted by party organizations at all levels to aid in the formulation of social development plans. The Leningrad party committee has formed a council for economic and social development to draft comprehensive city and oblast plans for 1976-80 and 1980-90.

Brezhnev incorporated many of these ideas in his report to the party congress in March 1971. He particularly urged that production associations become the "basic...links of social production." His real effort to woo the Leningraders came in December of that year, when he traveled to the city and gave official endorsement to the work on regional planning. Leningrad had already received public support for many of its programs from leaders such as Kirilenko, Mazurov, and Shelepin. Last year, a party-government decree ordered the nationwide formation of production associations.

Romanov has traveled widely abroad, most recently with Brezhnev to Cuba early this year. Last September, the US consul general in Leningrad

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became the second non-communist head of a consulate to be received by Romanov. At that meeting, Romanov said he was a strong advocate of improved relations with the US and favored a proposal to establish a "twin" relationship between Leningrad and San Francisco, where a Soviet consulate is located.

Dolgikh

Vladimir I. Dolgikh became Central Committee secretary for heavy industry in December 1972 with only three years of experience as a regional party secretary behind him. He brought to the leadership proven managerial ability and a history of strong advocacy of Siberian development.

Dolgikh served in the army in World War II and graduated from the Irkutsk Ore Mining and Smelting Institute in Siberia in 1949. He worked as an engineer in Krasnoyarsk and in 1958 joined the Norilsk Mining and Metallurgical Combine as chief engineer. He was director of this combine north of the Arctic Circle from 1962 to 1969, when it was growing rapidly. In 1965 the combine was one of the first enterprises in the country to adopt the economic reform system, and Kosygin went to Norilsk in January 1968 to inspect its accomplishments.

Dolgikh was promoted from plant director to first secretary of the sprawling Krasnoyarsk Kray in April 1969. In that capacity, he prepared a ten-year plan for the comprehensive development of the kray and submitted it to Moscow. He said later that Brezhnev "gave a high evaluation" of the plan and the Central Committee adopted a decree on it. In June 1971 Brezhnev praised the Krasnoyarsk plan "as an example" for Siberian development.

Dolgikh also publicly presented the case for Siberian development—in speeches, articles, and even in an interview with Western newsmen. One of his themes has been the economic rationale for such development. At the party congress in 1971, Dolgikh emphasized the cheapness of Krasnoyarsk coal. He thus seemed to be vying with the Ukrainian coal industry, which Ukrainian party



Dolgikh

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leader Shelest complained was being slighted. Dolgikh's other theme was that Siberian development has been hampered by the disjointed activity of central ministries and their failure to provide infrastructure and social amenities along with new production facilities.


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THE KREMLIN POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

Soviet leaders work within a system of power-sharing that gives voice at the top policy-making level to all the most powerful institutions and regional interest groups. This voice is roughly proportionate to the political weight of these institutions and groups in the country. Conflicting regional and bureaucratic pressures are thus joined at the Politburo level in a complex interplay of power and policy considerations.

The need to heed and reconcile many different points of view has produced a cautious and conservative leadership. The system of committee rule—"collective leadership" in Soviet parlance—has inhibited sudden or radical shifts in policy and has fostered a high degree of stability within the top ranks of the leadership. Although the political standing of certain Politburo members has at times changed sharply, removal of a Politburo member apparently requires a near consensus among his colleagues. There has, therefore, been very little attrition in the Politburo.



Soviet leaders walk to Lenin Mausoleum on May Day 1972

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The system has allowed for the emergence of party boss Brezhnev as the pre-eminent leader, but it does impose restraints upon his power. Brezhnev has been able to play off one regional or bureaucratic faction against another and has been the main beneficiary of the Kremlin's delicate balance of power. He has, however, been able to advance his own position only by paying close heed to the views of the most powerful interest groups. Anyone who hopes to succeed him will have to do likewise.

Collective Leadership—Modus Operandi

Khrushchev in his time paid lip service to the Leninist principle of collective leadership in which members of the Politburo share, although not equally, in formulating policy, but he increasingly violated it toward the end of his tenure. In fact, his tendency to bypass his Politburo colleagues on controversial issues was a major factor in uniting them against him. The group that ousted him in October 1964 informally agreed upon a number of organizational and procedural safeguards that have become more and more institutionalized with the passage of time. One was the decision to keep the two top posts of party boss and premier in different hands—certainly one of the main obstacles to the re-emergence of one-man rule.

Collectivity has also been protected to a certain extent by an elaborate system of mutual checks that prevents any one institution from dominating the policy-making process, or any one individual from establishing a foothold in more than one institution. This inhibits a member of one faction from moving against his rivals or his boss. Thus, when Andropov was appointed to the government post of KGB head, he was immediately dropped from the party Secretariat. He was, however, compensated with a position on the Politburo as a candidate member, which gave him direct access to the policy-making circle.

The current composition of the Politburo closely reflects and is responsive to the power relationships among the major interest groups in the country. In contrast to Khrushchev, who was constantly waging war against one bureaucratic element or another, the present leaders appear to want to avoid offending any of the major interest groups.

The party apparatus, the government, the military-industrial complex, the agricultural lobby, and important regional districts, all have someone on the Politburo to represent their interests. Even a party official like Andropov, who was given the top KGB post to ensure the party's control over the

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security forces, finds it wise to represent the agency he was sent to supervise. His need for a power base and the KGB's need to be heard in policy-making circles are bound to make for a mutuality of interest.

The appointment of Defense Minister Grechko and Foreign Minister Gromyko to the Politburo last April and the elevation of Andropov to full membership continued the trend of giving broad representation on the Politburo to key interest groups. An overriding consideration in Grechko's elevation, however, probably was the strong political support he had demonstrated for Brezhnev personally and for his detente policy.

Alignments among the 16 members of the Politburo tend to be based on mutual and institutional associations, but cliques have not turned out to be hard and fast. They tend to overlap and to shift from issue to issue. One question may pit the seniors—Brezhnev, Podgorny, Kosygin, and Suslov—against the junior members of the Politburo. Another may join party representatives against government officials.

The most durable, although now slowly dissolving, faction has been Brezhnev's "Ukrainian group." It is made up of the members of the Politburo—some Ukrainians, some Russians—who, like Brezhnev, got their start in politics in the Ukraine. While they have not always agreed with Brezhnev or each other on policy issues, they once formed the core of his political support. The group, which includes Podgorny, Kirilenko, Polyansky, and Grechko, now seems to be in the process of dissolution, and Brezhnev appears to be seeking new ties and new support elsewhere. He has, for instance, appeared of late to be more actively cultivating Russian interest groups than in the past.

There are no other groupings within the leadership comparable to the Ukrainians, although others may find a sense of solidarity by virtue of being the "outs."

Power Elites—Who Counts for What

The relative influence of the various institutional and regional groupings is best reflected in the composition of the Party Central Committee's voting membership. Its 229 current members make up a roster of the power elite and are an important forum of opinion. Although its role is primarily that of a rubber stamp, it has been called upon in the past to resolve political and policy disputes within the Politburo and could be called upon to do so again.

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Full-time party officials still make up the bulk of the voting membership with approximately 45 percent of the seats. The government executive branch comes next with 29 percent, while the legislative branch has only 5.4 percent. The representation of the military establishment has risen somewhat in the past decade and now accounts for a little over 8 percent. Because of the relatively greater cohesion within the military establishment than in other institutions, its political influence is probably greater than its numbers would indicate. This probably holds true also for the security and judicial agencies whose representatives on the Central Committee account for only 1.2 percent of the membership. Shelepin's trade union organizations have less than 1 percent of the seats. Intellectuals of any sort, particularly those who are associated with the creative arts or have liberal sympathies, are woefully under-represented.

Breaking down the membership in terms of economic interests, 23 percent are associated with farm affairs and 38 percent with industrial production. Of the latter, 23 percent are associated with the heavy industry and defense production and only 3.3 percent with consumer affairs.

The bloc of party officials is largely composed of regional party leaders, while the representation of the executive branch is heavily weighted with officials from the central government apparatus in Moscow.

This would seem to set the stage for party-state rivalry to take on the additional character of a conflict between regional and central interests. For example, some aspects of past and ongoing debates over economic administration apparently pit the regional bias of the party officials against the Moscow orientation of the government workers. The 1965 economic reform attempted to centralize economic decision making again by re-creating central ministries while at the same time expanding the rights of the individual plant managers. The real losers were regional officials at the oblast and republic level. Local party officials, the most vocal spokesmen for that level of management, were quick to make their discontent known.

Collectivity Versus Special Intersts

In recent years Brezhnev has given some recognition to the needs of local leaders. He has backed the Leningraders' scheme for putting regional planning under greater local control. He also lent his support to the Moldavian plan to group small farms into large associations, again under firm control of the republic party.

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The leadership continues to wrestle, however, with the problem of reconciling the interests of regional officials with those of the Moscow government bureaucracy—and fitting these local experiments into a coherent system of administration. There seems to be a general recognition that the entire system of economic management needs to be simplified and improved, but little agreement on how this is to be achieved. Brezhnev in December forcefully called for one integrated system of planning and management, but provided no details. Any reorganization, when it finally emerges, will undoubtedly contain large, indigestible chunks of compromise.

The history of Brezhnev's detente policy provides another example of the way in which the system of collectivity has acted as a brake on new policy initiatives. A workable consensus within the leadership in support of a policy of detente with the West was slow to emerge. It was apparently obtained only because Brezhnev made concessions in other areas of domestic policy and only at the cost, finally, of a rupture in the leadership ranks and new strains within the Ukrainian group.

Ukrainian party boss Shelest was the most outspoken critic of detente within the leadership. He was not a member of the Ukrainian clique in Moscow, but seemed to be close to two who were, Podgorny and Polyansky. None of the Ukrainian group, in fact, appeared to be out in front in support of detente. Moreover, some of Shelest's reservations concerning detente were apparently shared by party ideologist Suslov and by Belorussian party boss Masherov. In addition, there seemed to be considerable opposition to detente among regional party officials, perhaps because of their generally more insular outlook. Here again, the strength of this group on the Central Committee may well account for Shelest's success in holding out for so long.

Brezhnev was very slow to move against Shelest; he did so only after he had some successes to show for detente. When Brezhnev did move, he was careful not to criticize Shelest for his stand on foreign policy. Instead, he chose safer ground—Shelest's somewhat permissive attitude toward Ukrainian nationalism. On this issue Brezhnev could count on the support of both Suslov and Masherov, for despite their reported sympathies with Shelest's views on detente, they both were even more Moscow-oriented in their views on the matter of Soviet national minority relations than Brezhnev.

At the same time, Brezhnev sought to win over other conservative regional critics of detente by lending his name to some of their pet local schemes. This goal appears to have been a major factor in Brezhnev's support of the industrial and agricultural management experiments of the Leningrad

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and Moldavian party leaders. The party organizations in both regions tend toward rigid orthodoxy on ideological matters.

Shelest's position was seriously undermined by these tactics. Even so, he might not have been ousted from his Ukrainian post had he not, according to reports, over-reached himself at a Central Committee meeting by trying to reopen the question of the impending May 1972 summit after a decision to go ahead had already been reached in the Politburo.

Shelest's removal from the Politburo a year later in April 1973 and the other changes made in the membership of the Politburo at that time, such as the elevation of Grechko and Gromyko, seem to have significantly strengthened Brezhnev's hand in the pursuit of detente.

The Matter of Succession


Brezhnev may also now be in a stronger position to ensure that whoever eventually succeeds him will be of his own choosing and will continue the broad outlines of his domestic and foreign policy initiatives. Unlike Khrushchev, who fretted about it openly and endlessly, Brezhnev has given no outward signs of being concerned with succession. He may be content to procrastinate or to leave it in the hands of the Politburo and the major interest groups. There are, however, dangers in this. The senior members of the Politburo are getting on in years. Kosygin, Podgorny, Suslov and Grechko are all in their 70s, and Brezhnev is 67. None of the top leaders enjoys robust health, and the chance of all of them leaving the political scene in rapid succession increases with time. If this were to happen, severe strains would be placed on any orderly transfer of power.

Meanwhile, the most dynamic and outspoken younger members of post-Khrushchev leadership—Shelepin, Polyansky and Shelest—have fallen victim of their own political ambitions. In the system of collective leadership, favoring caution and compromise as it does, it is the more bureaucratic and self-effacing who have flourished.


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Soviet Leadership

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